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We consider optimal stopping problems in uncertain environments
for an agent assessing utility by virtue of dynamic variational pref-
erences as in [15] or, equivalently, assessing risk by dynamic convex
risk measures as in [4]. The solution is achieved by generalizing the
approach in [20] introducing the concept of variational supermartin-
gales and an accompanying theory. To illustrate results, we consider
prominent examples: dynamic entropic risk measures and a dynamic
version of generalized average value at risk introduced in [5].
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11 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
In our everyday life we face a broad variety of optimal stopping problems: We
accept bids for our used car to sell or stop the process of potential marriage
partners not knowing whether a more appropriate partner is still to come.
On ﬁnancial markets, agents try to maximize proﬁts from American options.
Hence, optimal stopping problems are not just of value for theoretical con-
siderations but of great virtue in applications. All examples have in common
that, on an abstract level, an agent has to ﬁnd an optimal stopping time for
some stochastic payoﬀ process.
The classical solution to this problem, as inter alia given in [17], assumes
the agent to possess a unique subjective prior ruling the payoﬀ process and to
maximize expected payoﬀ. In an uncertain environment however, there might
not be a unique prior distribution: On incomplete ﬁnancial markets, we might
be faced with multiple equivalent martingale measures not being sure which
one is ruling the world. Hence, with multiple possible distributions, a solution
to the problem by virtue of simple expected utility maximization with respect
to some subjective prior cannot be eligible: An alternative notion of“expected
reward”has to be used. In this article, we hereto choose dynamic variational
preferences.
Equivalently, a risk manager runs the danger of high model risk when
assuming a particular probabilistic model. An alternative route is given by
dynamic convex risk measures: the robust representation explicitly mirrors
multiplicity of possible distributions and hence reduces model risk. As will
be motivated below, both approaches, dynamic convex risk measures and
dynamic variational preferences, are equivalent in mathematical terms for
our model. Only the economic interpretation diﬀers.
In [20], the problem to optimally stop an adapted payoﬀ process (Xt)t∈N
facing uncertainty is considered when expected reward is induced by dynamic
multiple prior preferences introduced in [8]. By virtue of a robust representa-
tion theorem, expected reward at time 0 from stopping time τ is then given





for a ﬁxed set Q of prior distributions of the payoﬀ process. In this sense,
an uncertainty averse agent, not able to determine a unique subjective prior,
considers a set Q of distributions to be possible and equally likely. Equiva-
lently, the above minimized expectation is, modulo a minus sign, the robust
representation of coherent risk measures introduced in [1] and applied to a
dynamic setting in [19]: Risk is assessed as maximal expected loss with re-
spect to all distributions that are considered likely. Hence, model risk is1 INTRODUCTION 3
signiﬁcantly reduced as no speciﬁc probability distribution is assumed. How-
ever, limitations of coherent risk measures are stated in [10]: Due to homo-
geneity coherent risk measures do not account for liquidity risk. Secondly,
the robust representation shows coherent risk measures to assess risk quite
conservatively. To overcome these shortcomings, the coherent approach is
generalized to convex risk measures relaxing homogeneity and sub-additivity
to a convexity condition; in a dynamic context elaborately discussed in [11]
and [4]. Furthermore, the fundermental entropic risk measure is not coherent
but convex.
Equivalently, multiple prior preferences are generalized to so called vari-
ational preferences in [14] and to dynamic variational preferences in [15].
In a more general setup, dynamic risk adjusted values or concave utilities
are introduced in [4] for stochastic processes. Under the assumption of risk
neutrality but uncertainty aversion, a discount factor of unity and without
intermediate payoﬀs, expected reward πt at time t for stopping the process
(Xt)t with stopping strategy τ induced by dynamic variational preferences is
given by a robust representation of the form







for some dynamic penalty (αt)t. Intuitively, expected reward (πt)t is given
by minimal penalized expectation – penalized in the sense that nature has to
compensate the agent for choosing a distribution. Again, dynamic variational
preferences and dynamic convex risk measures are equivalent as the robust
representations coincide up to a minus sign: The equivalent dynamic convex
risk measure is then given as ρt := −πt. Hence, in terms of the above
robust representation, assing risk by virtue of dynamic convex risk measures
amounts to maximal penalized expected loss. It is immediate that dynamic
multiple prior preferences are a special case of dynamic variational preferences
when the penalty is trivial, i.e. only achieves values null and inﬁnity. In the
same token, this holds for dynamic coherent risk measures as a special case
of dynamic convex ones. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the
axioms of variational preferences or convex risk measures, respectively. We
just take the robust representation as given.
The dynamic penalty (αt)t, formally derived by a Fenchel-Legendre trans-
form, might be interpreted as ambiguity index as in [14] and [15]. From a
preference based point of view, (αt)t is a measure for uncertainty aversion:
Given two agents assessing utility in terms of dynamic variational prefer-
ences, one with penalty (α1




agent 1 is less uncertainty averse than agent 2. In other terms, risk measure
1 is less conservative than 2. Equivalently, we might think of (αt)t as an in-1 INTRODUCTION 4
verse likelihood of a distribution to be the ruling one: the larger the penalty,
the less likely the agent assumes the respective distribution. Thus, nature
has to compensate the agent more, the less likely the chosen distribution. In
the prominent example of entropic risk measures or multiplier preferences,
penalty is given by relative entropy. The“further away”a chosen distribution
in terms of entropy from the reference distribution, the higher the penalty
nature has to pay. Throughout this article we make use of robust representa-
tion in terms of the minimal dynamic penalty (αmin
t )t, uniquely characterizing
the underlying dynamic variational preference.
For dynamic models, the ﬁrst question is how conditional preferences πt
at distinct time periods are interrelated. An assumption that serves as a link
between time periods is time-consistency, deﬁned by virtue of πt = πt(πt+1).
Robust representation results showing equivalence of time-consistency and a
condition on minimal dynamic penalty (αmin
t )t, called no-gain condition, are
obtained in [4], [11], and [15]: Minimal penalty can be rephrased as a sum of
contingent penalties and a one-step-ahead penalty. Hence, time-consistency
leads to a recursive robust representation in terms of minimal penalized ex-
pected utility. As shown in [15], the no-gain condition on (αmin
t )t reduces to
stability of the set Q of priors for dynamic multiple prior preferences.
Results in this article constitute a generalization of results in [20] by
applying optimal stopping to dynamic variational preferences. By virtue
of the recursion formula for robust representation, we obtain a worst-case
distribution among those with ﬁnite penalty. However we do not obtain the
elegant intuition in [20] that the agent behaves as expected utility maximizer
with respect to the worst-case distribution as the penalty is not trivial and,
hence, does not necessarily vanish for the worst-case distribution. As in [17]
and [20], we make use of a Snell envelope approach to solve the optimal
stopping problem under dynamic variational preferences by showing equality
of the value function and an appropriately generalized Snell envelope, called
variational Snell envelope, for a ﬁnite horizon. In the inﬁnite horizon case,
we show the Bellman principle to hold for the value function. These results
allow us to obtain an optimal stopping strategy recursively. We observe that
the smallest optimal stopping time obeys well-known characteristics: Stop
when the payoﬀ process equals the problem’s value. A further result is a
minimax theorem. We introduce the notion of variational (super-, sub-)
martingales and an accompanying theory: We obtain a Doob decomposition
and an optional sampling theorem.
To illustrate our results, we consider two prominent examples: dynamic
entropic risk measures (or dynamic multiplier preferences) and a dynamic
convex generalization of average value at risk (AVaR) introduced in [5]. Ex-
amples are stated in terms of dynamic convex risk measures instead of dy-2 THE MODEL 5
namic variational preferences. Due to mathematical equivalence of both ap-
proaches, the reason is merely owed to topicality of appropriate risk measures
for ﬁnancial markets in face of the current ﬁnancial crisis questioning the core
of ﬁnancial practice. In the ﬁrst example on dynamic entropic risk measures,
we obtain quite intuitive results on the worst-case measure for a speciﬁc kind
of payoﬀ processes. Thereafter, we consider generalized average value at risk
(gAVaR) as introduced in [4]. As the natural dynamic extension of these
risk measures is not time-consistent, we achieve a time-consistent version by
virtue of a recursive construction in terms of the minimal penalty. As we see
in the examples, when considering non-trivial penalty functions applications
become more complex: in particular, independence, inevitably used in simple
examples in [20], does not hold any longer. Nevertheless, the second example
constitutes a tangible alternative to widely used VaR taking into account
liquidity risk, satisfying time-consistency, and avoiding the problem of risk
accumulation caused by VaR.
In [23] an approach to optimal behavior on ﬁnancial markets is applied
without time-consistency. Agents maximize minimal penalized intertemporal
utility as given above. Making use of convex conjugates, a minimax theorem
similar to ours is achieved but without constructive recursion for worst-case
measures. However, we are convinced that time-consistency is not only a
crucial property from a theoretical perspective but also intuitively justiﬁable.
The article is structured as follows: The next section deﬁnes the model,
gathers the relevant assumptions and then states the optimal stopping prob-
lem. This directly leads to the deﬁnition of variational supermartingales and
an accompanying theory in Section 3. Section 4 contains the main results.
Section 5 discusses examples. Thereafter, we conclude. Elaborate proofs are
given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Let T ∈ N ∪ {∞} and (Ω,F,(Ft)t≤T,P0) be an arbitrary but ﬁxed underly-





itively, the ﬁltration (Ft)t≤T models the information process for the agent.
Let (Xt)t≤T be an adapted essentially bounded payoﬀ process that the
agent aims to optimally stop in an uncertain environment, i.e. to ﬁnd a
stopping time τ in order to maximize expected reward. The speciﬁc form
of expected reward used in this article emerging from dynamic variational
preferences will be encountered below.
Equalities are meant to hold P0-a.s. Let Me(P0) denote the set of all2 THE MODEL 6
probability distributions on (Ω,F) that are locally equivalent to P0, i.e.
M
e(P0) := {P|∀t ≤ T,∀F ∈ Ft,P(F) = 0 ⇔ P0(F) = 0} .
As we see in [11], the assumption to only consider locally equivalent dis-
tributions is justiﬁed as the robust representation of dynamic variational
preferences is only based on these. Intuitively, the reference distribution P0
ﬁxes the null sets, i.e. sure and impossible events. Recall that a stopping
time τ is an integer valued random variable such that {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for all
t ≤ T. For ω ∈ Ω, we set Xτ(ω) := Xτ(ω)(ω). Let L∞ := L∞(Ω,F,P0) be
the space of all essentially bounded F-measurable random variables. Analog,
for t ≤ T, let L∞
t := L∞(Ω,Ft,P0) be the space of all essentially bounded
Ft-measurable random variables.
2.1 Robust Representation of Time-Consistent Dynamic
Variational Preferences
Given a stopping time τ, we ﬁrst have to answer how agents assess utility
in uncertain environments? More elaborately, given the agent is not able to
entirely assess the ruling distribution of the payoﬀ process and is uncerteinty
averse but risk neutral, how does expected reward look like? In expected
utility theory the agent is assumed to possess a unique subjective probability
distribution, say Q, and assesses expected reward by EQ[Xτ]. In [20] the
agent is not sure about the distribution of (Xt)t≤T but assumes the relevant
distributions in some convex set Q ⊂ Me(P0) all being equally likely. Then,
multiple prior expected reward is given by infQ∈Q EQ[Xτ].
In this article, we go a step further by assuming that an agent determines
expected reward in terms of dynamic variational preferences as introduced
in [15] or, equivalently, by a dynamic convex risk measure as in [11] assuming
risk neutrality and no discounting. As shown in [15] and [4], the agent then
assesses conditional variational expected reward πt(Xτ) at time t from stop-
ping at τ by virtue of a robust representation in terms of minimal penalized
expected utility. This is obtained from the axioms of dynamic variational
preferences. As we do not consider the axioms, we pose assumptions that
imply this robust representation.
Notation 2.1. Throughout this article, we denote by (ρt)t≤T a dynamic con-
vex risk measure as introduced in [11] or, equivalently, by (πt)t≤T the robust
representation of a dynamic variational preference as in [15]. Moreover, we
identify the preference with its robust representation.
We now state rigorous deﬁnitions obtained from [11] and [15]:2 THE MODEL 7
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Dynamic Penalty & Time-Consistency). (a) We call a fam-
ily (αt)t≤T a dynamic penalty if each αt satisﬁes:
• αt is a mapping αt : Me(P0) → L1
+(Ft): For each Q ∈ Me(P0), αt(Q)
is an Ft-measurable random variable with values in R+ ∪ {∞}.1
• For all t ≥ 0, αt is grounded, i.e. ess infQ∈Me(P0) αt(Q) = 0.
• αt is closed and convex.2
(b) Given a dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t≤T. At t, deﬁne the acceptance









for all Q ∈ M.3
(c) Let (pt)t≤T (resp. (qt)t≤T) denote the density process of P (resp. Q) in
Me(P0) with respect to P0, i.e. pt := dP
dP0
     
Ft
, where dP
dP0 denotes the Radon-
Nikodym derivative. For a stopping time θ deﬁne the “pasted distribution”










pt if t ≤ θ,
pθqt
qθ else.
(d) (αt)t≤T satisﬁes the no-gain condition if for all t ≥ 0 and Q we have
αt(Q) = E
Q [αt+1(Q)|Ft] + ess inf
P∈M
αt(Q ⊗t+1 P). (1)
(e) (πt)t≤T is called time-consistent if it satisﬁes πt = πt(πt+1) for all t < T.
Equivalently, ρt = ρt(−ρt+1).4
1More elaborately, for all ω ∈ Ω, αt( )(ω) is a function on the Ft-bayesian updated dis-
tributions in Me(P0), i.e. the eﬀective domain satisﬁes eﬀdom(αt( )(ω)) ⊂ {Q( |Ft) : Q ∈
Me(P0),ω ∈ Ft ∈ Ft}. Hence, when writing αt(Q) we actually have in mind αt(Q( |Ft)).
2This assumption is well deﬁned by [10], Remark 4.16.
3(αmin
t )t≤T is a penalty function in terms of (a).
4In general, time-consistency is deﬁned as: ρt = ρt(−ρt+s), t,s ≤ T, t + s ≤ T.
In this sense, our deﬁnition of time-consistency is a special case, called “one-step time-
consistency” in [4]. However, for the proofs in this article, our deﬁnition is suﬃcient and,
of course, always satisﬁed in the general case of time-consistency. On the other hand, one-
step time-consistency implies general time-consistency under our continuity assumptions
by Proposition 4.5 in [4]. Hence, our deﬁnition of time-consistency in terms of ”one-step
time-consistency” is equivalent to the general notion of time-consistency.2 THE MODEL 8
Notation 2.3. Deﬁne the set M of distributions in Me(P0) by5
M := {Q ∈ M
e(P0) | α0(Q) < ∞}.
Given the distribution Q ∈ M, Q|Ft denotes the restriction of Q to Ft given
Ft−1. As usual Q( |Ft) denotes the conditional probability distribution of the
process given history up to time t.
Taking into account that αt only depends on bayesian updates, we simplify
notation when appropriate and write αt(Q ⊗t+1 P) = αt(qt+1pt+2 ...).
Assumption 2.4 (Main Assumption). Throughout this article we assume
the agent to assess risk in terms of a relevant time-consistent dynamic convex
risk measure (ρt)t≤T on the set of essentially bounded F-measurable random
variables as in [11] or, equivalently, assess utility in terms of time-consistent
dynamic variational preferences (πt)t≤T for end-period payoﬀs as in [15] with
no-discounting and risk neutrality. Furthermore, we assume continuity from
below for (ρt)t≤T, i.e. for all (Xn)n ⊂ L∞ such that Xn ր X for some
X ∈ L∞, we have ρt(Xn) ց ρt(X). Equivalently, we assume continuity from
below of (πt)t≤T, i.e. πt(Xn) ր πt(X) for the above sequence.
Remark 2.5. Given the payoﬀ process (Xt)t≤T and stopping time τ ≤ T, [4]
and [11] show that, under Assumption 2.4, (ρt)t≤T and (πt)t≤T have a robust
representation of the form










t )t≤T, the minimal penalty, assumed to satisfy the no-gain condition.
Consider a distribution Q ∈ Me(P0) such that, for all t, αt(Q) = 0 and
∞ else: We achieve expected utility with subjective prior Q. As shown in
[15], multiple prior expected reward with Q ⊂ Me(P0) is a special case of
variational expected reward with αt = 0 on Q and ∞ else. Hence, the present
article is a generalization of the approach in [20].
By the Fenchel-Legendre Transform, minimal penalty can be written as
α
min




5It can be seen in [11], Lemma 3.5, that this domain of a penalty is well deﬁned in
case of relevant time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures as relevance allows to only
consider the set of locally equivalent distributions in the robust representation and time-
consistency in conjunction with relevance implies αt(Q) < ∞ for all t. We call a dynamic
convex risk measure (ρt)t≤T relevant, if P0[ρt(−ǫIA) > 0] > 0 for all t, ǫ > 0 and A ∈ F
such that P0[A] > 0.2 THE MODEL 9
for all Q ∈ M. The term “minimal” is justiﬁed as the robust representation
allows for multiple penalties (αt)t≤T, but the minimal one satisﬁes αmin
t (Q) ≤
αt(Q) for all Q ∈ M. The minimal penalty uniquely characterizes the agent’s
preferences or, equivalently, risk attitude. Throughout, we assume a robust
representation in terms of minimal penalty for technical reasons.
The intuition of equation (1) is the following: Nature has to pay a penalty
for choosing a speciﬁc distribution at time t: αt. On the left hand side of
equation (1), nature uses the time-consistent way by just choosing a prob-
ability Q, pay the appropriate amount and do nothing in the next period
but go with the conditional distribution Q( |Ft). However, the right hand
side describes the possibly time-inconsistent way of choosing a probability:
It chooses today a distribution P that inuces the same distribution today
as Q but may diﬀer from tomorrow on and pays the amount αt(Q ⊗t+1 P).
In the second step, i.e. after realization of Ft+1, nature may deviate and,
conditionally on Ft, choose a distribution Q. If this time-inconsistent way
of choosing a distribution is not less costly, (αt)t satisﬁes equation (1). In
particular, the cost of choosing Q at time t can be decomposed into the sum
of expected cost of choosing Q’s conditionals at time t + 1 and the cost of
inducing Q|Ft+1 as a so-called one-period-ahead marginal distribution of the
payoﬀ process at time t. The no-gain condition on (αt)t is the generalization
of the time-consistency condition in [20]: As shown in [15], if (αt) is trivial,
the no-gain condition is equivalent to stability of the set of priors. This also
holds true in the not necessarily ﬁnite case as shown in e.g. in [4]. In course
of this section, we explicitly show time-consistency results.
Remark 2.6. (a) As motivated in Remark 2.5, the no-gain condition on
(αmin
t )t is equivalent to time-consistency. We will make this explicit later.
(b) As stated in [12], Remark 1.1, continuity from below of πt or ρt im-
plies continuity from above of either one. Continuity from above is equivalent
to the existence of a robust representation of πt (or ρt) in terms of minimal
penalized expected payoﬀ. Continuity from below induces the worst case dis-
tribution to be achieved. We will make this explicit in Proposition 3.2. We
hence could change the inf into a min but stick to the notion above as this
seems common in the literature.
Remark 2.7. The following assumption is equivalent to πt (or equivalently




       
Ft
        P ∈ M,α
min
t (P) < c
 
,
for each c ∈ R, t ∈ N, being relatively weakly compact in L1(Ω,F,P0).2 THE MODEL 10
Proof. Theorem 1.2 in [12] states the assertion in an unconditional setting.
Due to the properties of conditional expectations, the assertion also holds in
our dynamic set-up.
Remark 2.8 (Conditional Cash Invariance). One of the axioms of dynamic
variational preferences (and dynamic convex risk measures) is conditional
cash invariance. In conjunction with a normalization assumption, this prop-
erty becomes: for all t ≤ T and Ft-measurable Xt, we have πt(Xt) = Xt.
As we do not consider the axiomatic approach, we immediately derive this
property from the robust representation as αt is assumed to be grounded:




t (Q) = Xt.
The next result explicitly states the connection of time-consistency and
the no-gain condition. The proof is a special case of the proof of Theorem
4.22 in [4]. It is stated as it generates fruitful insights.
Proposition 2.9. Equation (1) implies time-consistency of (πt)t≤T. More
precisely, we have for all (Xt)t≤T and τ ≤ T
πt(Xτ) = XτI{τ≤t} + πt(πt+1(Xτ))I{τ≥t+1} = πt(πt+1(Xτ)).
Proof. See Appendix A.1
As in [15], we have the following result on the recursive structure of
variational expected reward πt at time t. However, we achieve this result
for more general probability spaces but under the assumption of end-period
payoﬀs, risk neutrality and a discount factor of unity.
Corollary 2.10. Given equation (1), it holds
πt(Xτ) = XτI{τ≤t} + ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
  








t (  ⊗t+1 Q) ∀  ∈ M|Ft+1,
and M|Ft+1 denotes the set of all distributions in M restricted on Ft+1 condi-
tional on Ft. To have this expression well-deﬁned, we set ess infP∈M αmin
t ( ⊗t+1
P) := ess infP∈M αmin
t (Q ⊗t+1 P) with Q ∈ M such that Q|Ft+1( |Ft) =  .
Proof. See Appendix A.12 THE MODEL 11
γt might be viewed as nature’s penalty when choosing the one-period-
ahead marginal  . Hence, it is called one-period-ahead penalty in analogy to
[15]. In terms of γt, equation (1) becomes
α
min
t (Q) = E
Q[α
min
t+1(Q)|Ft] + γt(Q|Ft+1( |Ft)). (2)
Remark 2.11 (Bellman Principle for Nature). Given τ ≤ T, Corollary 2.10
can be rephrased as







Intuitively, this constitutes a Bellman principle for nature’s choice of a
worst-case distribution:6 Given the optimal (worst-case) distribution from
time t+1 on, represented by its value πt+1, nature chooses a minimizing one-
period ahead conditional distribution Q|Ft+1. Note, that the above expression
is basically the same as the robust representation but in terms of a one-
step-ahead problem. This insight is particularly adjuvant when constructing
a worst-case distribution in Proposition 3.2 in terms of pasted one-period
ahead conditional distributions.
2.2 The Agent’s Problem
Given (Xt)t≤T, T ∈ N∪{∞}, the agent has to maximize variational expected
reward (πt(Xτ))t≤T, i.e. the agent solves the following problem by ﬁnding an











among all stopping times that are universally ﬁnite, i.e.
inf
Q∈M
Q[τ < ∞] = 1.
Deﬁnition 2.12 (Value Function, Snell Envelope). (a) For the problem at
hand, the value (function) (Vt)t≤T at time t ≤ T is given by











6This should not be mixed up with the Bellman principle in the next chapter’s theorems
on optimal stopping: there, we achieve Bellman equations for the optimal stopping decision
of the agent, not for the worst-case distribution decision of nature.3 VARIATIONAL SUPERMARTINGALES 12
(b) For ﬁnite T, deﬁne the variational Snell envelope (Ut)t≤T of (Xt)t≤T with
respect to dynamic minimal penalty (αmin











for t < T. (4)
(c) Deﬁne the stopping time
τ
∗ := inf{t ≥ 0|Ut = Xt}. (5)






Ut+1d  + γt( )
  
Subsequently, we show that the value function and the variational Snell
envelope coincide when T is ﬁnite. In the inﬁnite time-horizon case, we show
the Bellman principle to hold for the value function allowing for recursive
solutions. Furthermore, it follows that τ∗ is an optimal stopping time, i.e.
a solution to the initial problem. Note, that the variational Snell envelope
coincides with the multiple prior Snell envelope in case of multiple prior
preferences as introduced in [20]. It coincides with the “good old” Snell
envelope as e.g. set out in [17] in case of a unique subjective prior.
3 Variational Supermartingales
From the approach to optimal stopping in terms of Snell envelopes or more
generally with multiple prior Snell envelopes as in [20], we know that the value
function satisﬁes some kind of martingale property until optimal stopping
and some kind of supermartingale property thereafter. We now come up
with an appropriate notion of martingale for dynamic variational preferences
generalizing the notion of multiple prior (sub-, super-) martingales in [20]:
Deﬁnition 3.1. Given dynamic minimal penalty (αmin
t )t∈N satisfying equa-
tion (1). Let (Mt)t∈N be an (Ft)t∈N-adapted process with EQ[|Mt|] < ∞ for
all t ∈ N and all Q ∈ M. (Mt)t∈N is called a variational (sub-, super-)
martingale with respect to (αmin









= (≥,≤)Mt.3 VARIATIONAL SUPERMARTINGALES 13
[20], Lemma 6, shows an elegant way to characterize the concepts of mul-
tiple prior (sub-, super-) martingales in terms of (sub-, super-) martingales
with respect to a worst-case distribution P∗ ∈ Q. However, this result is
owed to the simple structure of (αmin
t )t∈N in the multiple priors case. Un-
der variational preferences we can state a similar result for variational su-
permartingales as being a supermartingale “modulo penalty” with respect
to some worst-case distribution Q∗ ∈ M. This non-vanishing penalty is
the reason why the intuition of an agent behaving as expected utility maxi-
mizer under the worst case distribution does not carry over from [20]. The
worst-case distribution is achieved recursively: At each time t, the worst-case
conditional one-step-ahead distribution is chosen. In [20], time-consistency is
needed to ensure the recursively pasted distribution to be again in the set pri-
ors Q. By deﬁnition of M and equation (1), we obviously have that pasted
distributions are again in M: αmin
t+1(Q) < ∞ implies αmin
t (Q) < ∞. The
most important part in our construction is that, given equation (1), pasting
of worst-case one-step-ahead distributions is consistent with being of worst-
case type: Having achieved a worst-case distribution from t + 1 onwards, we
paste this with the one-step-ahead worst-case conditional distribution from t
to t + 1 and achieve the worst-case distribution from time t onwards.
Proposition 3.2. Let (Mt)t∈N be an adapted process and (αmin
t )t∈N satisfy
equation (1).
(a) If (Mt)t∈N is a Q-submartingale for all Q ∈ M, then (Mt)t∈N is a varia-
tional submartingale with respect to (αmin
t )t.
(b) (Mt)t∈N is a variational supermartingale with respect to (αmin
t )t∈N if and








In particular, (Mt)t∈N is a Q∗-supermartingale, i.e. EQ∗[Mt+1|Ft] ≤ Mt.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
Remark 3.3. By lemmata in Appendix A.2, the foregoing assertion can be





In the same token as in [20], we generalize standard results for super-
martingales to our notion of variational supermartingales.
Proposition 3.4 (Doob Decomposition). Let (St)t∈N be a variational super-
martingale with respect to dynamic penalty (αmin
t )t∈N satisfying equation (1).4 MAIN RESULTS 14
Then there exists a variational martingale (Mt)t∈N with respect to (αmin
t )t∈N
and a predictable non-decreasing process (At)t∈N, A0 = 0, such that St =
Mt − At for all t and this decomposition is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
In [20], the proof of optional sampling is immediate as the minimal penalty
vanishes; here we mimic the proof of the original optional sampling theorem.
Proposition 3.5 (Optional Sampling). Let (St)t∈N be a variational super-
martingale with respect to dynamic minimal penalty (αmin
t )t∈N satisfying equa-
tion (1) and σ ≤ τ be universally ﬁnite stopping times. Then









Proof. See Appendix A.3
Corollary 3.6 (from Propsition 3.5). Let (St)t∈N be a variational super-
martingale with respect to dynamic minimal penalty (αmin
t )t∈N satisfying equa-
tion (1). Then we have for every universally ﬁnite stopping time τ









Proof. See Appendix A.3
4 Main Results
We are now enabled to state and prove the main results of this article.
These directly generalize the results in [20] to dynamic variational prefer-
ences. Throughout, we assume (αmin
t )t≤T to satisfy equation (1).
4.1 Finite Horizon
Let T < ∞. The following result extends the fundamental Propositions
VI-1-2 and VI-1-3 in [17] to dynamic variational preferences:
Theorem 4.1. (a) The variational Snell envelope (Ut)t≤T deﬁned in equation
(4) is the smallest variational supermartingale with respect to (αmin
t )t≤T that
dominates (Xt)t≤T.
(b) We have Ut = Vt for all t ≤ T, i.e. the variational Snell envelope,
equation (4), equals the problem’s value function, equation (3).
(c) τ∗ from equation (5) is the smallest optimal stopping time, i.e. solves
the optimal stopping problem stated in Remark ??.4 MAIN RESULTS 15
Proof. See Appendix A.4
We now state a minimax-theorem allowing to interchange the “inf” and
“sup”in the formulation of the problem: It does not matter if nature chooses
a worst case distribution ﬁrst and then the agent maximizes or vice versa.


















Proof. See Appendix A.4
Remark 4.3. Posed in another way, we have






















t denotes the Snell envelope of the expected-utility optimal stopping
problem with subjective prior Q. Hence, we do not have the elegant result as
in [20] that the variational Snell envelope (Ut)t≤T is the lower envelope of the
individual Snell envelopes (U
Q
t )t≤T as the penalty is not necessarily zero.
Remark 4.4. Set QM the worst-case distribution for dynamic variational
preferences and QQ the worst-case distribution for multiple priors in Q as-
suming M = Q, i.e. the sets of distributions with ﬁnite penalty coincide.
Let (Vt)t≤T denote the value function for dynamic variational preferences
and (V
Q
t )t≤T the value of the optimal stopping problem with subjective prior
Q for an expected utility maximizer. We then have

















In other words, sophistication of (αmin
t )t≤T increases expected reward. In-
tuitively: The agent has more information on the likelihood of distributions
available under variational preferences than under multiple priors and hence
values the problem more. Stated in other terms more important to applica-
tions in risk management: Convex risk measures assess risk in a more liberal
fashion than coherent ones given the sets of considered distributions coincide.5 EXAMPLES 16
4.2 Inﬁnite Horizon
Let T = ∞. We now show the value function to satisfy the Bellman principle:
Theorem 4.5. (a) The value process (Vt)t∈N as deﬁned in equation (3) is the
smallest variational supermartingale with respect to (αmin
t )t∈N that dominates
the payoﬀ process (Xt)t∈N.











for all t ≥ 0.
(c) τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0|Vt = Xt} is the smallest optimal stopping time.
(d) Let (UT
t )t≤T denote the variational Snell envelope with respect to (αmin
t )t≤T
for the optimal stopping problem of (Xt)t≤T truncated to ﬁnite horizon T <
∞. Let (Vt)t∈N denote the value of the inﬁnite problem. Then we have
limT→∞ UT
t = Vt for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The last part of the foregoing theorem is particularly valuable for con-
structive solutions of inﬁnite models in terms of limiting solutions of trun-
cated ones.
5 Examples
In this section, we consider optimal stopping problems for prominent exam-
ples of dynamic variational preferences. First, we consider stopping with
dynamic multiplier preferences or, equivalently, dynamic entropic risk mea-
sures. Secondly, we apply our theory to a generalized version of average value
at risk (gAVaR) particularly paying attention to time-consistency issues.
In [20], simplicity of examples is due to triviality of the dynamic minimal
penalty for multiple prior preferences. In particular, for monotone problems,
this fact allows to obtain a worst-case distribution by virtue of stochastic
dominance for the expectation operator. Then, the agent behaves as expected
utility maximizer with respect to this worst-case distribution. As the penalty
is not trivial here, we might have a trade oﬀ between stochastic dominance on
the payoﬀ process and the penalty. Hence, the worst-case distribution cannot
be attained any longer by stochastic dominance for the payoﬀ process even in
the monotone case. Furthermore, we observe that correlation is introduced
even in quite simple contexts.5 EXAMPLES 17
5.1 Dynamic Entropic Risk Measures
As ﬁrst example we consider dynamic entropic risk measures as in [4] and
[11] or, equivalently, dynamic multiplier preferences as in as in [15].
Deﬁnition 5.1. For P ≪ Q, locally, we deﬁne the conditional relative en-
tropy of P with respect to Q at time t ≥ 0 as


















        Ft
 
I{Zt>0},







Basic properties of relative entropy are stated in [7]. As we assume local
equivalence, the indicator function in the last equation vanishes.
We now formally introduce dynamic multiplier preferences:
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let θ > 0. We say that dynamic variational expected reward
(πe
t(Xτ))t≤T is obtained by dynamic multiplier preferences given reference
model Q or, equivalently, by dynamic entropic risk measures, if its robust
representation is of the form
π
e




P[Xτ|Ft] + θ ˆ Ht(P|Q)
 
. (6)
Intuitively, the agent expects a reference distribution Q ∈ M most likely
and distributions further away – in the sense of relative entropy – seem to be
more and more unlikely.







Proposition 5.4. Dynamic multiplier preferences with reference distribution
Q ∈ M are time-consistent: Its robust representation has minimal penalty
αmin
t (P) = θ ˆ Ht(P|Q) for t ≤ T, P ∈ M. Hence, we have
πe




t+1(Xτ)d  + θ ˆ Ht+1( |Q( |Ft))
 
I{τ≥t+1},
where we set ˆ Ht+1( |Q( |Ft)) := Eµ[ln(
dµ
dQ(·|Ft)|Ft+1
)] which, by abuse of no-







)],   ∈ M|Ft+1.5 EXAMPLES 18
Proof. The speciﬁc form of minimal penalty is shown in [11], Lemma 6.2;
time-consistency in [11], p.92. The intuitive representation in terms of one-
step ahead penalty can straightforwardly be achieved by Corollary 2.10; as
the calculations are simple but extensive, we do not state them here.
As we want to achieve explicit solutions, we further conﬁne ourselves:
Assumption 5.5. Let the underlying probability space (Ω,F,(Ft)t≤T,P0) be
given as the independent product of the time-t state space, (S,S,ν0), S ⊂ R.
Then P0 = ⊗T
t=1νo and Fs is generated by the projection mappings ǫt : Ω  → S,
t ≤ s. In particular, the ǫt’s are i.i.d. with ν0 under P0.





β ≈ P0 :
dPβ
dP0
   













s=1 L(βs)) for some predictable process (βt)t≤T ⊂
[a,b] ⊂ R and L(βt) := ln
 
S eβtxν0(dx).
Notation 5.6. The reference distribution of the entropic penalty write as
Q := Pβ1, i.e. (β1
t)t≤T denotes the process deﬁning the penalty’s reference
distribution. Other distributions in M[a,b] write as P := Pβ2. Then, the






















   




We write Eβ := EPβ and ˆ Ht(β2|β1) := ˆ Ht(Pβ2|Pβ1) as well as αmin
t (β2).
Note, in case Q = P0, we have (β1
t)t≤T = 0 and hence for P = Pβ2: αmin
t (β2) =











Hence, the value function is achieved by
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In particular, we see that the value of the problem – and hence the worst case
distribution – depends on the reference distribution Q = Pβ1 of the penalty.
To further solve problems under entropic risk, we constraint ourselves to
monotone problems:
Assumption 5.7. Xt := f(t,ǫt), t ≤ T, where f is a bounded measurable
function that is strictly monotone in the state variable ǫt.
For monotone payoﬀ processes under multiple priors it is shown in [20]
that Ut is increasing in ǫt. However, having a look at the proof therein, we
see that this crucially depends on ǫt being independent of Ft−1 which does
not hold in case of dynamic variational preferences. Furthermore, in [20] the
calculation of a worst case measure is done by virtue of stochastic dominance
on the payoﬀ process. It is intuitive that this cannot work as elegant under
variational preferences as the penalty is not trivial. In particular, in the
entropic case, the worst-case measure depends on the reference distribution
Q: there might be a trade oﬀ between stochastic dominance on (Xt)t and the
penalty: The penalty increases the further nature moves away from Q and in
direction of a distribution minimizing the expectation of the payoﬀ process.
Example 5.8. Let f be increasing and the reference distribution be Pa. We
encounter for the ﬁrst term in the value function, Eβ2[f(τ,ǫτ)|Ft]: Pa is
stochastically dominated, i.e. minimizes that term on M[a,b]. Pa also mini-
mizes the penalty: ˆ Ht(β2|a) is increasing in β2 on [a,b], ˆ Ht ≥ 0 and zero if
and only if Pβ2 = Pa. Hence we have equivalence of the problem under dy-
namic multiplier preferences and the expected utility problem under the worst
case distribution Pa as in Theorem 5 in [20]:
Proposition 5.9. Let f be increasing, T < ∞, and τa denote the optimal
stopping time for the classical optimal stopping problem of (Xt)t≤T under
subjective distribution Pa, i.e. τa solves max0≤τ≤T Ea[Xτ]. Let Q = Pa be the
reference distribution for the penalty. Then, τa is the solution to the robust
problem with dynamic multiplier preferences (πe
t)t≤T.
Proof. For all increasing bounded measurable functions h : Ω → R and all
t ≥ 1, we have by Lemma 13 in [20]
E



















where the last equation follows as the joint minimizer of both summands is Pa.
Given this result, we can mimic the proof of Theorem 5 in [20]: Let (Ut)t≤T de-
note the variational Snell envelope of the problem with multiplier preferences
and reference distribution Pa and (Ua
t )t≤T the classical Snell envelope with
respect to subjective prior Pa. For t = T, we have UT = XT = f(T,ǫT) = Ua
T
and hence increasing in ǫT. As by induction hypothesis Ut+1 is an increasing
function of ǫt+1, say Ut+1 = u(ǫt+1) for some bounded measurable increasing
















a[Ut+1|Ft] + θ ˆ Ht(a|a)









The argument in the foregoing proof for the case Q = Pa is that Pa mini-
mizes EP[f(t,ǫt)] as well as ˆ Ht(P|a). Of course, this does not hold true if the
reference distribution Q = Pβ1 is such that β1
t is not identical a. Then, we
have a trade oﬀ between a decrease in the ﬁrst term, EP[f(t,ǫt)], which is in-
dependent of Pβ1, and an increase of the penalty in the second term, ˆ Ht(P|β1),
the further nature deviates from the reference distribution Pβ1.However, mov-
ing from Pβ1 in direction of the upper extremal distribution Pb, both terms
increase:
Proposition 5.10. Let Q = Pβ1 ∈ M[a,b] be the reference distribution of the




















t,b] for all t as ˆ Ht−1(β1|β1) = 0 and ≥ 0 else and furthermore
Eβ2[h(ǫt)|Ft−1] is increasing in β2 as seen in the proof of Lemma 13 in [20]. As
ˆ Ht( |β1) is strictly increasing on [β1
t,b], we have strict inequality on ]β1
t,b].
Remark 5.11. In particular, we see that the worst case distribution depends
on the speciﬁc form of f, not just on f being increasing. This has severe
consequences for the complexity of calculations: Let us for example take the5 EXAMPLES 21
case of an American call as considered in [20]. When out of the money,
nature cannot just apply a distribution low enough to likely staying out of the
money but also has to take care of being close enough to Q not to increase the
penalty too much. In particular, the one step ahead worst case distribution
depends on the current state: In case of dynamic variational preferences,
correlation is already introduced for the call that has independent rewards
under multiple priors as shown in [20].
In general, we obtain a negation of Theorem 5 in [20] for our approach:
Remark 5.12. Let (¯ β2
t)t denote the process of the worst-case distribution for























t denotes the classical Snell envelope of the optimal stopping problem
under subjective prior given by ¯ β2. In particular, we see that
τ
∗ = inf
t {Xt = Ut} ≥ inf
t {Xt = U
¯ β2
t } = τ
¯ β2∗.
The intuition in [20] is not valid anymore: The agent does not behave as
the expected utility maximizer under the worst case distribution. However,
sophistication of the penalty has increased the problem’s value.
Example 5.13 (American Options in CRR-Model). Consider an agent with
expected reward (πe
t)t≤T given by parameter θ = 1 and reference distribution
Pb, i.e. the agent to consider the market as “emerging”. We consider Amer-
ican options for the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model: Let Ω := {0,1}T,
T < ∞. Let ǫt : Ω → {0,1}, t ≤ T, be the projection mappings and P0 such
that ǫt’s are i.i.d. under P0 with P0[ǫt = 1] = P0[ǫt = 0] = 1
2. Let M[a,b] be
given as in Assumption 5.5. As in [20], we then have for all β := (βt)t that
Pβ[ǫt = 1|Ft−1] ∈ [p; ¯ p], where p := ea
1+ea and ¯ p := eb
1+eb. Let Pa be again the
distribution induced by the constant process with βt = a for all t and equiva-
lently for Pb. Then, under Pa, ǫt’s are i.i.d. with Pa[ǫt] = p and equivalently
for Pb with Pb[ǫt] = ¯ p.
The “ingredients” of the CRR-model are given by a risk-less asset with
value process Bt = (1 + r)t for some ﬁxed interest rate r > −1 and a risky
asset with value process St at t such that S0 = 1 and
St+1 = St  
 
(1 + d) if ǫt+1 = 1,
(1 + c) if ǫt+1 = 0,5 EXAMPLES 22
where we assume the constants to satisfy −1 < c < r < d for the model not
to allow for arbitrage opportunities.
Let Ap(t,St) bei an American put and, hence, decreasing in St for all t.
Let (Ub
t)t≤T denote the classical Snell envelope of Ap(t,St) under subjective
probability Pb, i.e.
Ub
t (t,St) = max
 
Ap(t,St); ¯ pUb
t (t + 1,St(1 + d)) + (1 − ¯ p)Ub
t (t + 1,St(1 + c))
 
.
The following assertion holds: The variational Snell envelope (Ut)t≤T of the
American put problem with dynamic multiplier preferences (πe
t)t≤T and refer-
ence distribution Pb satisﬁes (Ut)t≤T = (Ub
t)t≤T. In particular, the worst case
distribution is given by Pb and, as the penalty vanishes for this distribution,
the optimal stopping time is given by τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|Ap(t,St) = Ub
t} = τb∗,
i.e. the optimal stopping time τb∗ of the problem under subjective prior Pb.
The proof of this assertion is immediate by virtue of stochastic dominance:
As in Appendix H in [20], we show for the variational Snell envelope (Ut)t≤T
that Ut = u(t,St) = Ub
t, t ≤ T, for a function u that is decreasing in the
second variable: First, we have UT = Ap(T,ST) = Ub
T by deﬁnition. For an
inductive proof, we write with a slight but intuitively understandable misuse
of notation ˆ Ht(pt+1 ⊗ pt+2 ⊗ ...|Pb)7 for pi ∈ [p; ¯ p] and note that ˆ Ht(¯ p ⊗
¯ p ⊗ ...|Pb) = 0 and ≥ 0 else. From the induction hypothesis, we have u(t +






pt+1u(t + 1,St(1 + d))
+(1 − pt+1)u(t + 1,St(1 + c))




Ap(t,St) ; ¯ pu(t + 1,St(1 + d)) + (1 − ¯ p)u(t + 1,St(1 + c))
+Ht(¯ p ⊗ ¯ p ⊗ ...|Pb)





In a way, the result in the example is more like a self fulﬁlling prophecy
as the agent assumes the worst-case distribution to be the most likely one.
The same holds true for an American call with reference distribution Pa: In
that case, the reference distribution is also the worst-case one. However, due
to the tradeoﬀ eﬀects, Pa is not the worst-case distribution for the American
call when Pb is the reference distribution; as Pb is not worst-case distribution
for the American put when Pa is the reference one.
7Formally: ˆ Ht(pt+1 ⊗ pt+2 ⊗ ...|Pb) := ˆ Ht(Pβ|Pb) with (βt)t≤T such that Pβ[ǫt =
1|Ft−1] = pt for t ≤ T; well deﬁned as p1,...,pt drops by general deﬁnition of ˆ Ht.5 EXAMPLES 23
5.2 Dynamic Generalized AVaR
In the ﬁnancial industry value at risk (V aR) still is a standard method for
risk quantiﬁcation and risk management. Prominence of VaR is due to its
simplicity and intuitive appeal. Though widely used, V aR is not convex:
Applying V aR, a risk oﬃcer runs the danger or accumulating a highly risky
portfolio. A standard example is inter alia given in [16]. Being aware of
VaR’s shortcomings, average value at risk (AV aR) is introduced taking into
account not only loss probabilities in terms of quantiles, as V aR does, but
also the amount of possible loss. Nevertheless, AV aR is still intuitive and







for some level λ ∈]0,1[. It can be shown that AVaR satisﬁes a robust repre-









Hence AV aR is a coherent risk measure. Elaborate discussions on AVaR can
be found in [16]. A generalization, called utility based shortfall risk measure,
is introduced in [12]. A convenient representation for AV aR which has an
immediate generalization to a convex risk measure, called generalized AV aR
(gAV aR) here, is given in [12]. This convex risk measure gives raise to a
variational preference in the canonical way.
As shown in [6] as well as [2] the natural dynamic extension of AV aR, and
hence of gAV aR, in terms of conditional expectations is not time-consistent.
We thus deﬁne a time-consistent dynamic version of gAV aR, directly induc-
ing a time-consistent dynamic variational preference, recursively in terms of
the penalty function as in [15] by composing one period ahead penalties.
To introduce a dynamic version, we start with the static convex risk
measure gAV aR for some end period payoﬀ XT ∈ L∞
T as in [5]:
Deﬁnition 5.14. For (θ,β,p) ∈]0,∞[×]1,∞[×[1,∞[, deﬁne the risk mea-
sure gAVaR for XT ∈ L∞
T , called generalized Average Value at Risk (gAVaR):
gAV aR
β,p












where      p := (EP0|FT [|   |p])
1
p denotes the usual p-norm.5 EXAMPLES 24
For ease of notation, we do not explicitly state the parameters but just
write gAV aR instead of gAV aR
β,p
θ when these are obvious. We have:
Proposition 5.15. (a) For (θ,β,p) ∈ ]0,∞[×]1,∞[×[1,∞[, gAV aR
β,p
θ is
















β−1 and c = θd−1β1−dd−1. Hence
gAV aR
β,p




Q|FT [−XT] − c










(b) For θ ∈]0,1[, β = p = 1, we have  
dQ|FT
dP0|FT




the robust representation becomes
gAV aR
1,1














A time-consistent dynamic version of AV aR for end period payoﬀ XT
is recursively achieved in [6]. Mimicking this approach by virtue of the
deﬁnition of time-consistency for dynamic convex risk measures, i.e. ρt =
ρt(−ρt+1), we would obtain a time-consistent dynamic version of gAV aR
β,p
θ .
However, this would not be in terms of a robust representation needed to
achieve explicit solutions in terms of worst-case distributions. Hence, we use
the minimal penalty αmingAVaR of the static gAV aR as deﬁned in Proposition
5.15: We apply the recursive procedure from [15], Theorem 2, in terms of
one period ahead penalties (γ
gAV aR
t )t≤T to achieve a time-consistent dynamic
minimal penalty (αmingAVaR
t )t≤T. Deﬁne γ
gAV aR
t on M|Ft+1 by
γ
gAV aR









   
Ft+1













0 if Q = I{ω},







t+1 (Q( |Ft+1))dQ( |Ft) + γ
gAV aR
t (Q( |Ft)|Ft+1)
if Q(Ft) > 0,
α
mingAVaR
t (Q)(Ft) := ∞ if Q(Ft) = 0,6 CONCLUSIONS 25
for t < T. Hence, for XT ∈ L∞














t )t≤T is a time-consistent dynamic variational pref-
erence: It is a dynamic variational preference by virtue of its deﬁnition in
terms of a robust representation. Time-consistency follows by Proposition
2.9 as (αmingAVaR
t )t≤T is deﬁned recursively in terms of the no-gain condition.
Thus, we have a recursive representation for the variational Snell enve-
lope of time-consistent dynamic variational preferences (παmingAVaR
t )t≤T. This
representation enables us, given an explicit structure of (Xt)t≤T, to solve the
problem for an optimal stopping time τ∗ as in Theorem 4.1.
6 Conclusions
We have generalized the theory of optimal stopping with multiple priors as
set out in [20] to dynamic variational preferences introduced in [15] or, equiv-
alently, dynamic convex risk measures in [11]. To achieve our results, we have
introduced the notion of variational supermartingales as a generalization of
the usual notion of supermartingales. For this concept, we have obtained re-
sults including a Doob decomposition and optional sampling. These enabled
us to generalize the classical optimal stopping approach for an expected util-
ity maximizer in [17] (Section VI.1) in terms of Snell envelopes to the case
of dynamic variational preferences by virtue of variational Snell envelopes.
We have achieved minimal optimal stopping times and an explicit character-
ization of worst-case distributions. We have shown that the solution to the
inﬁtite horizon problem can be approximated by a sequence of solutions for
an approximating sequence of ﬁnite horizon problems. A further insight is
a minimax theorem similar to a minimax result in [23] but making use of
time-consistency.
Our results were applied to prominent examples: dynamic entropic risk
and dynamic generalized average value at risk. For the latter, we are not
aware of any reference having considered this notion in a dynamic context.
To conclude, the virtue of the present article is that optimal stopping
problems are now solved for dynamic variational preferences or, equivalently,
dynamic convex risk measures. This is important for applications on ﬁnancial
markets: coherent risk measures, as a robust approach reducing model risk,
are too conservative. Convex risk measures are a comprehensive vehicle to
more liberally assess risk while still being robust, as no speciﬁc probabilisticA PROOFS 26
model is assumed, and satisfying the “margin of conservatism” required in
the Basel II accord.
Our approach leaves a realm for further generalizations. It seems possible
to achieve the results in this article for general time-consistent (monotone)
monetary risk measures, i.e. relaxing the convexity assumption. Of course,
in that case, the robust representation in terms of penalty α does not hold
anymore. However, as explicitly stated, the variational Snell envelope does
not need a robust representation and can hence be generalized to more general
risk measures as done in [4], Chapter 5.3. It is shown that the value function
is time-consistent and again a monetary risk measure. Due to a missing
robust representation, the solution is not explicit. The next direction in
which theory might be generalized is to relax the assumption of the payoﬀ
process being essentially bounded. Several of the cited references consider
convex risk measures for Lp processes or, as in [5], risk measures deﬁned on
Orlicz spaces.
Besides these theoretical considerations, further examples and concrete
applications might be elaborated: dynamic convex risk measures based on
expected shortfall, inter alia elaborated in [12] and [9], are a generalization
of dynamic entropic risk measures or dynamic multiplier preferences when
loss is not exponential.
At last, the problem might be considered in a continuous time setting.
Several approaches to convex risk measures in a time-continuous framework
are available: In [3], dynamic convex risk measures are achieved by virtue of
BMO martingales. A special case of this approach is given in [22] via BSDE
resulting in g-expectations as introduced in [18].
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.9
Proof of Proposition 2.9. (i) τ ≤ t: In this case, Xτ is Ft-measurable and in
particular Ft+1-measurable. Hence, by conditional cash invariance, we have
πt(Xτ) = Xτ = πt+1(Xτ)
and hence πt(Xτ) = πt(πt+1(Xτ)).
(ii) τ ≥ t + 1: “≤”: If, for all Q ∈ A, we have
α
min
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t+1(P) : P ∈ M
 





As M is closed under pasting, we obtain for all Q ∈ M and such Pn:











t (Q ⊗t+1 Pn)
≤ E
Q⊗t+1Pn[Xτ|Ft]























Hence, letting n → ∞, we achieve for all Q ∈ M
πt(Xτ) ≤ E
Q [πt+1(Xτ)|Ft] + α
min
t (Q).















t (Q ⊗t+1 P)























Q [Xτ|Ft+1] + α
min
t+1(Q)










Q⊗t+1P [πt+1(Xτ)|Ft] + α
min
t (Q ⊗t+1 P)
 
≥ πt(πt+1(Xτ)).
Applying the essential inﬁmum, we achieve
πt(Xτ) ≥ πt(πt+1(Xτ)).A PROOFS 28
Proof of Corollary 2.10. By conditional cash invariance, we have
πt(Xτ) = XτI{τ≤t} + πt(πt+1(Xτ))I{τ≥t+1}.
As πt+1 is Ft+1-measurable we have, whenever τ ≥ t + 1,









































t (  ⊗t+1 P)






A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The following lemmata directly generalize Lemmata 9 and 10 in [20] to dy-
namic variational preferences applying interim results from [11].
Lemma A.1. Let Z ∈ L∞





τ (Q) : Q ∈ M, P
τ|Fτ = P0|Fτ
 
is downward directed, i.e. for any Q1,Q2 ∈ M with Q1|Fτ = Q2|Fτ = P0|Fτ,
there exists Q3 ∈ M with Q3|Fτ = P0|Fτ such that
EQ3[Z|Fτ] + αmin
τ (Q3) = min
 
EQ1[Z|Fτ] + αmin




Proof. Let Q1 and Q2 be chosen as above. Consider some arbitrary set










We have Q3 ∈ M, Q3|Fτ = P0|Fτ, and by [11], Lemma 3.3, we have the local
propery of dynamic minimal penalty:
α
min
τ (Q3) = IBα
min
τ (Q1) + IBCα
min
τ (Q2) < ∞.A PROOFS 29











































which completes the proof.
Lemma A.2. For all   ∈ M|Ft+1 there exists P∗ ∈ M( |Ft+1) such that
αmin
t (  ⊗t+1 P∗) = ess infP∈M(·|Ft+1) αmin
t (  ⊗t+1 P).
Proof. By the weak compactness of the set of density processes, it is suﬃcient
to show that there exists a sequence (Pn)n ⊂ M( |Ft+1) such that
α
min




t (  ⊗t+1 P).
Hence, it suﬃces to show that for all   ∈ M|Ft+1, the set
{α
min
t (  ⊗t+1 Pn) : P ∈ M( |Ft+1)}
is downward directed, i.e. for every P1,P2 ∈ M( |Ft+1), there exists a P3 ∈





t (  ⊗t+1 P1),α
min




t (  ⊗t+1 P3). (8)
Indeed, set A := {αmin
t (  ⊗t+1 P1) < αmin










By Lemma 3.3 in [11], we have αmin
t (  ⊗t+1 P3) = IAαmin
t (  ⊗t+1 P1) +
IACαmin
t ( ⊗t+1 P2) since  ⊗t+1 P3 = ( ⊗t+1 P1)IA +( ⊗t+1 P2)IAC. Hence,
equation (8) to holds.
Lemma A.3. Let Z ∈ L∞
s , s ≤ T, and τ a stopping time. Then there exists















Proof. In case τ ≥ s, the assertion obviously holds true by conditional cash
invariance: Both sides of the equation equal Z.
Hence, we consider the case τ < s. To show: ∃ (Pm)m ⊂ M with


















for some P∞ ∈ M by weak closeness assumption as Pm →m→∞ P∞ weakly.
Setting P∞ =: Pτ then concludes the proof.
It leaves to prove existence of a sequence (Pm)m ⊂ M with the above
properties: As in the proof of Lemma 10 in [20], Bayes rule as well as the
dependence of ατ only on the Fτ-conditional distribution allows us to restrict
attention to Q ∈ M such that Q = P0 on Ft. This is made explicit in
Corollary 2.4 in [11]. Hence, existence of the sequence is assured by Lemma
A.1 showing the set
 




Corollary A.4 (from Lemma A.3). For all Z ∈ L∞




µ[Z|Ft] + γt( )) = E
µ∗
[Z|Ft] + γt( 
∗).
Lemma A.2 and Corollary A.4 prove Proposition 3.2:
Proof of Proposition 3.2. ad (a): Let (Mt)t∈N be a submartingale for every
Q ∈ M, i.e.
E





















ad (b): “⇐” Let Q∗ ∈ M be such that Mt ≥ EQ∗[Mt+1|Ft] + αmin
t (Q∗).






is a variational supermartingale w.r.t. (αmin
t )t∈N and a Q∗-supermartingale:
Mt ≥ EQ∗[Mt+1|Ft] + αmin
t (Q∗) ≥ EQ∗[Mt+1|Ft].
“⇒”By making use of Corollary 2.10, we will explicitly construct a worst-
case distribution Q∗ ∈ M that satisﬁes














for t < T, attained due to continuity from below. Let M( |Ft) denote the
set of all distributions in M conditional on Ft. We have














      
Mt+1









∗ as achieved in Corollary A.4
= E










∗|Ft+1( |Ft) ⊗t+1 Q
∗( |Ft+1))












where Q∗( |Ft) := Q∗|Ft+1( |Ft)⊗t+1 Q∗( |Ft+1) is the pasting of the Q∗|Fs’s,
s ≥ t, and Q∗ the respective recursive pasting. The last equality makes use
of the fact that the dynamic minimal penalty only depends on conditionals –
hence justiﬁes our intuitive notation – and that the conditional expectation
is the unconditional one with respect to the conditional distribution.
A.3 Proofs of Propositions 3.4 & 3.5

























− Mt = 0,
as M is assumed to be a variational martingale. By uniqueness of αmin
t , due
to the relevance assumption, and as A is assumed to be predictable, we have









This shows uniqueness of A and hence of M.A PROOFS 32
(b) Existence: Deﬁne (At)t∈N by virtue of A0 = 0 and









Then, At+1 ∈ Ft, i.e. (At)t∈N is predictable and non-decreasing as (St)t∈N is



























Thus, (Mt)t∈N is a variational martingale with respect to (αmin
t )t∈N.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. We know from Proposition 3.2 that there exists a







(i) First, we show that for ﬁxed N ∈ N a stopped “supermartingale modulo





































































































i (P∗). Now, let B ∈ Fσ and deﬁne
S
B := σIB + κIBC, T
B := τIB + κIBC,


































































































































for a variational martingale M; for τ = σ
Mσ = Mτ = E
P∗
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t (Q) = Sτ.A PROOFS 35
A.4 Proof of Theorems 4.1 & 4.2
The following proof is analog to the respective one in [20].
Proof of Theorem 4.1. ad (a): By deﬁnition we have Ut ≥ Xt, t ≤ T, and






for all t ≤ T − 1. Hence, (Ut)t≤T is a variational supermartingale with re-
spect to (αmin
t )t≤T exceeding (Xt)t≤T. Let (Zt)t≤T be another such variational
supermartingale with respect to (αmin
t )t≤T. We show (Zt)t≤T ≥ (Ut)t≤T in-
ductively: By deﬁnition ZT ≥ XT = UT. Assuming Zt+1 ≥ Ut+1, we achieve

































ad (b): We ﬁrst show“≥”: By Proposition 3.5, we have for the variational
supermartingale (Ut)t≤T ≥ (Xt)t≤T and all t ≤ τ ≤ T:





























To show “≤”, we deﬁne the stopping rule
τ
∗
t := inf{s ≥ t : Us = Xs}.
Now, ﬁx t ≤ T. If we can show the stopped variational supermartingale
(Us∧τ∗
t )t≤s≤T to be a variational martingale with respect to (αmin
s )t≤s≤T, we
are done: Indeed, in that case we have, as τ∗
t ≥ t,




























= Vt.A PROOFS 36
Hence, it leaves to show the variational martingale property of the stopped
variational Snell envelope (Us∧τ∗
t )t≤s≤T: Let t ≤ s < T.
(i) Whenever τ∗



























s (Q) = Us∧τ∗
t .
(ii) For τ∗
t > s, we have (by (a) and the deﬁnition of τ∗
t ) Us > Xs and hence
Us∧τ∗
























(i) and (ii) show the stopped variational martingale property.




0 = inf{s ≥ 0 : Us = Xs}






























Hence, τ∗ is optimal. Morover, any stopping time such that P0[τ∗∗ < τ∗] > 0
cannot be optimal as in that case, by deﬁnition of τ∗ and part (b),









Proof of Theorem 4.2. “≤”: This inequality is shown in [21] for general minimax-
problems.
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as αmin













t (Q) = Xt.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Again, the proof follows the lines of [20].
Lemma A.5. Let (αmin
t )t∈N be a dynamic minimal penalty satisfying equation










       τ ≥ t
 
is upward directed, i.e. for any two stopping times τ1,τ2, there exists a stop-





































and the stopping time τ3 := τ1IA + τ2IAC.







= EQ3[Xτ3|Ft] + αmin
t (Q3)I{τ3>t}
= EQ3[Xτ1|Ft]IA + EQ3[Xτ2|Ft]IAC + αmin









































where the second equality follows from the local property of minimal penalty,
























































Proof of Theorem 4.5. ad (b): “≥”: By Lemma A.5, there exists a sequence
















































































































This shows “≤” since the above inequality holds for all τ ≥ t and hence
for the ess supτ≥t. Hence (b) is achieved.
ad (a): By (b) we have for all t








and Vt ≥ Xt.
Hence, (Vt)t∈N is a variational supermartingale with respect to (αmin
t )t∈N and
Vt ≥ Xt. Let (Wt)t∈N be another variational supermartingale with respect to
(αmin
t )t∈N exceeding (Xt)t∈N. By Proposition 3.5 we have for all τ ≥ t ∈ N

















as Wτ ≥ Xτ and, hence,











ad (c): As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show (Vs∧τ∗)s∈N to be a



















ad (d): Since (Xt)t∈N is assumed to be bounded, (UT
t )t≤T is bounded,
too. Furthermore, enlarging the set of stopping times when considering the
process up to T + 1 instead of T, we have UT
t ≤ U
T+1
t . Hence, the limit
U∞
t := limT→∞ UT



































t )t∈N is a variational supermartingale with respect to (αmin
t )t∈N
exceeding (Xt)t∈N. We now show (Vt)t∈N = (U∞
t )t∈N, where (Vt)t∈N is the
inﬁnite horizon problem’s value function: By (a) and (Ut)t∈N being a varia-
tional supermartingale exceeding (Xt)t∈N, we have (U∞
t )t∈N ≥ (Vt)t∈N. From
the ﬁnite horizon problem, we have for all T and t
U
T





























This shows (Vt)t∈N = (U∞
t )t∈N and completes the proof.
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